We consider optimal monetary policy in a model that integrates credit frictions in the standard New Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages as well as adjustment costs of capital. Different from traditional models with credit frictions such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) , the model is able to generate an anti-cyclical external finance premium as observed empirically in the US economy. Monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor rule according to which the nominal interest rate is set as a function of the deviation of the inflation rate from its target rate, the output gap, and Tobin's q. The latter is measured by the relative price of newly installed capital. We show that that monetary policy should optimally decrease interest rates with higher capital prices. However, the consideration of Tobin's q implies only small welfare effects.
Introduction
The financial crises of 2007 has triggered renewed interest into a debate which started in the late 1990: should central banks target asset prices? Gerlter (1999, 2001) were among first to ask how central bankers should react to asset price volatility.
Bernanke and Gertler argue that there is no need for concern if asset price movements reflect changes in economic fundamentals. In this case, asset prices are only relevant with regard to monetary policy if they convey additional information about the state of the econommy. However, if asset prices were driven by nonfundamental factors, their influence could be destabilizing. For this case, they consider a bursting asset price bubble in a version of the model developed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and show that asset price targeting may even destabilize the economy.
More recently, the question of asset price targeting has been analyzed in models that introduce financial frictions in the standard New Keynesian business cycle. For instance, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) argue that asset price targeting may increase the parameter region within which the rational expectations equilibrium is not unique so that sunspot equilibria arise. Machado (2012) considers learning in the model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) and shows that asset price targeting may hamper the convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium. Christiano et al. (2010) study a purely newsdriven upswing in a model with the financial accelerator of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) . The central bank can moderate the effects of this kind of shock if it also reacts to the increased credit demand of borrowers. Faia and Monacelli (2007) introduce a nominal price rigidity into the financial accelerator model of Carstrom and Fuerst (1997) . The interaction between the nominal friction and the financial friction requires a negative response of the nominal interest rate set by the central bank and the relative price of capital. Moreover, the welfare gains of targeting the price of capital in addition to inflation are very small as compared to a strict anti-inflation policy.
However, it is questionable whether this result holds in a more general setting because, in their model, business cycle fluctuations are mainly driven by shocks to total factor productivity. The present paper is intended to fill this gap.
In this paper, we follow Faia and Monacelli (2007) and consider the desirability of asset price targeting with respect to its effect on the welfare of the representative household.
We employ the approach pioneered by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004 , 2005 , 2007 and compute the welfare effects of an extended Taylor rule relative to a simple Taylor rule that just reacts to the deviation of inflation from the central bank's target. As in these papers we disregard rules that i) lead to indeterminacy and ii) may hurt the zero lower bound. We consider different kinds of financial frictions and a richer structure of shocks. In this way we provide a more balanced view on the desirability of asset price targeting.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we introduce a first model with the usual shock to total factor productivity and a government spending shock. The model features two nominal frictions (price and wage staggering a la Calvo (1982) ) and a financial friction in the production of primary goods as proposed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) . Section 3 presents the calibration of the model. In Section 4, we present our results. The conclusion of Faia and Monacelli (2007) remains intact in our model with sticky wages and multiple shocks: the welfare gains of targeting the relative price of capital are negligible. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The model merges a standard New Keynesian model with sticky nominal prices and wages as, e.g., in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) , and adjustment costs of capital as, e.g., in Jermann (1998) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) , with the credit friction model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) .
Structure of the Model
The model consists of a household, the government, a labor agency, a sector of primary goods producers, a wholesale sector, a final goods sector, and a capital goods producing sector. Time is discrete and denoted by t. Figure 2 .1 illustrates the flows of factor services and goods between the household and the various sectors of the economy.
The household has a unit mass of members who rent their labor services N ht to the labor agency. The agency sells a composite N t of these services to the primary goods producers. Each firm f ∈ [0, 1] in this sector employs labor N t and capital services from the household sector K Ht and from other firms X t to produceỸ t units of a good, which serves as input in the production of intermediary goods. Each firm j ∈ [0, 1] 
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in this sector produces a differentiated good Y jt and sells it to the final goods sector.
This sector bundles the intermediary goods and sells consumption goods C t to the household, investment goods I t to the capital goods sector and public goods G t to the government. New capital goods are produced from capital services rented from the household and primary goods producers and from investment goods. They are sold to primary goods producers X t+1 − (1 − δ)X t and to the household K Ht+1 − (1 − δ)K Ht .
Final Goods
The firm in this sector buys the brands Y jt , j ∈ [0, 1] at the nominal price P jt from the intermediary goods sector and combines them to a final good Y t , which is sold at the nominal price P t to the household as consumption good C t and to the capital goods production sector as investment good I t . The technology is given by
The zero-profit condition
implies the usual demand function for intermediary good j:
where
is the price index.
Capital Goods
We implement adjustment costs of capital as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) .
New capital goods are produced from capital services K t = K Ht +X t rented at the price r Kt and from investment goods I t according to the function Ψ(I t /K t )K t . They are sold at the price q t . The function Ψ is increasing in its argument and strictly concave. As usual, we assume that it is costless to keep the capital stock constant: Ψ(δ) = δ and Ψ ′ (δ) = 1, where δ is the rate of capital depreciation. In our numerical simulations we employ the function
5a)
so that profits are zero in equilibrium.
Intermediary Goods and Price Setting
A firm j ∈ [0, 1] in the intermediary sector buys goods at the nominal price P yt from the primary production sector, brands it and sells it at the price P jt to the final goods sector. Its profit in units of the final product equals
and is distributed to the household sector. In each period t a randomly selected fraction 1 − ϕ y of firms in this sector receives the signal to optimally choose their relative price p At = P At /P t . The remaining fraction is allowed to raise their nominal price P N t according to the inflation rate observed in the previous period:
Primary Production
Primary production is organized in a sector with a unit mass of firms f ∈ [0, 1]. In Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) these firms are owned by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. We follow Chugh (2013) and assume that the household owns the firms but that firms are more impatient than the household. This reflects an un-modeled principal agent problem that drives a wedge between the interest of the household and the management of the firm. Its effect is to prevent full self-financing of firms.
Firm Assets. The firms need credit to pay for their factor services in advance. In order to get credit they have to accumulate assets. Let X f t denote the stock of capital owned by firm f at the beginning of period t. The firm rents this capital at the price r Y t to other primary goods producing firms. When production in this sector has taken place it rents the same amount to the capital goods sector at the rate r Kt . In addition to its factor income the firm receives a small transfer ∆ f t from the household. This ensures that the firm will be able to continue its operates even in the case of credit default. The transfer is deducted from the firms dividend payment to the household.
The net worth N W f t of the firm, therefore, is equal to
Production and Factor Demand. The firm f employs labor N f t and capital K f t to produce the amount
ω f t is an idiosyncratic shock, distributed iid with density φ and mean E(ω f t ) = Ω t . Z t is an aggregate shock that is governed by
The firm must pay for its factor services
in advance, where w t is the wage rate in units of the final good. The firm observes Z t but not ω f t before it decides on the size of its credit M f t − N W f t . After it has observed ω f t the firm maximizes
so that all firms employ the same capital-laborratio k t = (K f t /N f t ). As a consequence, the scaled Lagrange multiplier of the constraint λ f t /ω f t ≡ v t is independent of the firm index f , and
(2.12)
Thus, in terms of the final good, v t is a mark-up on factor costs M f t . For later reference note that this relation can be integrated to x f t df for x ∈ {M, N, K} and that the first-order conditions for factor demand can be written in terms of aggregate variables:
The Credit Contract. The firm borrows the amount M f t −N W f t intra-period from the household. The realization of ω f t is private information. If the creditor wishes to see the firm's production, he must pay a screening cost. This cost is proportional to factor costs in terms of the final good v t M f t with factor of proportionality κ. This is the costly state verification framework of Townsend (1979) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) ,
and Williamson (1987) employed in Fuerst (1997, 1998) .
The credit contract specifies M f t , the lending rate r Lt , and a bankruptcy thresholdω f t , given bȳ
so that for ω f t <ω f t the firm defaults and the creditor seizes the firm's output less the screening costs. Otherwise the firm redeems the loan, pays the interest and keeps all of its production. Because the household lends to all firms, he can fully diversify the risk and acts as if he was risk averse. The expected return for the firm equals
Using (2.15) this can be written as
Note that from (2.12) the expected return to the borrower can also be written as a fraction of the factor costs in terms of final output,
depends on the distribution φ so thatω t is independent of the firm index (which we therefore have dropped). The expected return of the creditor equals
Using (2.15) and (2.14c) this is equal to v t M f t g(ω t ) with
Finally, note that
The optimal pair (M f t ,ω t ) maximizes the expected return of the firm v t M f t f (ω t ) subject to the participation constraint of the household. Because the loan is intra-period the household will be indifferent between lending to a producer or keeping his funds if he will at least get back his loan:
This pair solves
Note that condition (2.19a) determines the bankruptcy threshold as a function of the markup on factor costs v t , which, thus, is equal for all firms f . Also note that equations (2.19b) and (2.8) can be aggregated over all firms in the primary production sector.
Asset Accumulation of the Firm. We assume that the firm distributes
as dividends to the household. As we shall demonstrate in a moment, the household's discount factor for returns from period t + s is equal to β s Λ t+s /Λ t , where Λ t is the multiplier of the household's budget constraint. The firm is more impatient than the household and employs the discount factor (βγ) s Λ t+s /Λ t with γ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the value of the firm is given by
Substituting for D f t from (2.20), for M f t from (2.19b), and for N W f t from (2.8) and maximizing with respect to X f t+1 yields the Euler equation
Labor Demand
The household has a unit mass of members h ∈ [0, 1] who sell their labor services N ht at the wage rate W ht to an agency. The agency bundles them into a single service, 22) and sells this service at the nominal wage W t to the primary good producers. The zero profit condition
implies the demand function 23) and the wage index
(2.24)
Wage Setting
The current period utility u of household member h depends on his consumption C ht , labor supply N ht and the consumption habitC t . We parameterize u as:
(2.25)
In equilibriumC t equals previous period's aggregate consumption
In each period a random fraction 1 − ϕ n of the household members receive a signal to choose their nominal wage W At optimally. The remaining fraction ϕ n is allowed to increase their wage W N t according to the price inflation observed in the past period:
Those who optimize set their real wagew t = W At /P t to maximize
subject to labor demand (2.23) and the budget constrain
where RM T t is a stand in for the remaining terms of this constraint to be introduced in the next subsection.
Consumption and Portfolio Allocation
As usual we assume that the members of the household pool their income so that their decision to consume and save is subject to a budget constraint in which we can ignore the index h. The representative household owns two different kinds of assets: 1 physical capital K Ht and nominal bonds B t . The latter pay the predetermined nominal interest rate Q t − 1. The former yield a factor income of (r Y t + r Kt )K Ht because capital is first employed in the production of primary goods and then in production of capital goods.
2 In addition to interest income, rental income, and wage income w t N t , the household receives dividends from the primary goods producers D f t df and dividends from the intermediary goods producers D jt dj. He pays taxes T t to the government, and spends the remaining income on consumption C t and asset accumulation. His budget constraint in terms of the final goods, therefore, reads:
(2.27)
Per capita consumption C ht = C t and the future stock of capital K Ht+1 are determined from maximizing
subject to the budget constraint (2.27). The respective first-order conditions are
Government
The government's budget constraint is
We assume B t = 0 for all t and that government spending G t is governed by
Monetary Authority
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate Q t+1 according a Taylor rule. The rule includes the previously set interest rate Q t to account for sluggish adjustment, the deviation of the inflation π t rate from the target rate π, the deviation of Tobin'st from its steady state value of q = 1, and the deviation of output Y t from its stationary level Y :
The choice of the parameters δ 2 , δ 3 , and δ 4 must satisfy two requirements: (i) the equilibrium dynamics of the economy must be determinate and (ii) the Taylor rule is subject to the zero lower bound, (i.e. Q t ≥ 1.)
Equilibrium Dynamics
In equilibrium all markets clear. Capital services employed in the production of primary goods equal
and accumulate according to 34) where the right-hand side of equation (2.13) was used to replace v t M t . Aggregating equation (2.8) over all primary production firms yields
Condition (2.19b) and equation (2.13) implỹ
Consolidating the budget constraints of the household, the government, and the definition of dividend payments to the household yields
Market clearing for intermediary goods requires 1 0
Y jt dj =Ỹ t and the first part of the intergral term equals Y t (see (2.2)). Hence, the preceding equation reduces to the resource constraint:
This may look somewhat uncommon. But note that Ω t acts as a second shock to aggregate factor productivity in the primary goods production. For Ω t = 1 (as assumed by Fuerst (1997, 1997) ) the left-hand side reduces to
The second term are the resources employed in screening bankrupt firms in the primary production sector in units of the final good. Without those costs we are back at the
We present the full system of equations that determine the dynamics of the model in the Appendix.
Welfare Analysis
Our goal is to determine whether or not the inclusion of Tobin's q in the Taylor rule (2.31) does improve monetary policy. Our point of reference is the welfare associated with δ 1 = δ 3 = δ 4 = 0 and δ 2 = 1.5. Let
denote the expected discounted life-time utility of the family associated with this solution, whereÑ
We solve the model for non-zero coefficients δ i , i = 1, . . . , 4 on a four-dimensional grid.
(2.39) be life-time utility implied by any of these solutions. We determine λ so that
Like the policy functions that solve the model, λ is a function of the given initial state of the system. In our model the vector of state variables x includes the aggregate stock of capital K t , the nominal interest rate factor Q t , aggregate consumption and the real wage as of period t − 1, C t−1 , and w t−1 , the lagged rates of price and wage inflation, π t−1 , and ω t−1 , the measures of price and wage dispersion s y t−1 and s n t−1 , respectively, 4 , the log of total factor productivity ln Z t , and the shock in the Taylor rule σ Q ǫ t . We approximate λ(x) at the point x = [K, Q, C, w, π, ω, 1, 0, 0], where the K, Q = π/β, C, w, π, ω denote, respectively, the capital stock, the interest rate factor, consumption, the real wage, price and wage inflation on the balanced growth path of the deterministic counterpart of the model. In the Appendix we show that up to second order accuracy
(2.41)
In this expression, V i σσ are the second partial derivatives of V i , i = C, N with respect to the scaling parameter in the driving process of the shocks, z t = Πz t−1 + σΩǫ t ,
Calibration
We calibrate the model with respect to the U.S. economy. The length of the period is one quarter. 
them.
As far as possible we follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) . Accordingly, -we choose a steady state real interest rate of 3 percent per annum so that β = 1.03 −0.25 , -employ log-preferences with respect to consumption so that η = 1, -set the habit parameter χ equal to 0.65, -assume a Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1/ν 1 equal to unity, -determine the parameter ν 0 so that the steady state value of N equals one,
-set the capital share in output equal to α = 0.36, -the rate of capital depreciation equal to δ = 0.025, -the price elasticity of demand for intermediary goods equal to ǫ y = 6, -the wage elasticity of labor demand equal to ǫ n = 21, -the fraction of firms not setting their price optimally equal to φ y = 0.60, and -the fraction of household members not setting their wage optimally equal to φ n = 0.64.
With respect to the credit friction we draw on Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) . They employ κ = 0.25 for the costs of bankruptcy, use a log-normal distribution of the idiosyncratic shock ω, and determine the parameters of this distribution as well as the bankruptcy thresholdω from three targets: a mean of one, a quarterly bankruptcy rate of 0.974 percent, and an annual external finance premium of 187 basis points. Given ω, equation (2.19a) determines the mark-up v, and he value of the additional discount factor γ follows from the steady-state versions of equations (2.21) and (2.28b) as:
The steady state share of government spending in output G/Y = 0.16 as well as the parameters of the TFP shock and the government spending shock stem from SchmittGrohé and Uribe (2007) . We also follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) and set the Finally, to consider the potential of our model to produce a counter-cyclical external finance premium, we disregard the spillover from the aggregate shock to the mean of the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity modeled in Faia and Monacelli (2007) .
Therefore, Ω t = 1 for all periods.
Results
In this section, we present our results how the introduction of a q-target in the Taylor rule affects the utility of the households. In particular, we search for the optimal monetary policy rule and analyse if monetary policy should respond to higher asset prices by lowering or increasing interest rates. Our benchmark is the Taylor rule (2.31) with zero coefficients on the past interest rate δ 1 = 0, a coefficient of δ 2 = 1.5 on the inflation gap, and zero coefficients on capital price δ 3 = 0 and the output gap δ 4 = 0.
We compute the welfare gains of policies with non-zero δ i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 over the grid 2) The price and 3) wage dispersion forces the household members to spread consumption and labor supply unevenly over the continuum of consumption goods and labor services, respectively. 6 The Taylor rule that maximizes the welfare gain of the Notes: ζ is the elasticity of Tobin's q with respect to the investment-capital ratio I/K. δ i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 denote the coefficients of the Taylor rule (2.31) on the past interest rate, the inflation gap, the price of capital, and the output gap, respectively. λ is the percentage of consumption that must be given (taken if positve) to the household in the pure inflation target regime with δ 2 = 1.5 and δ i = 0, i = 1, 3, 4, to make him equally well-off as under the rule specified in columns ii-v.
household places a negative coefficient on the price of capital,
for the case of high (low) adjustment cost, ζ = 5.0 (ζ = 2.5). Compared to a policy which ignores this variable (columns iii and v), there is a welfare loss of about 0.018 (ζ = 0.5) and 0.01 (ζ = 2.5) percentage points, respectively.
The intuition behind this result rests on the observation that the cycle is mainly driven by the supply shock. A positive supply shock increases labor productivity. Due to the nominal frictions the real wage does not fully reflect this effect, the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and labor productivity widens. The household's supply of labor declines. If the central bank also reacts to the increased price of capital and lowers the nominal interest rate the household shifts consumption to the current period and the pressure on prices to fall is reduced. The gap between productivity and real wages diminishes and dampens or even overturns the negative effect on labor supply. Table 4 .2 presents the results for the benchmark model with the financial friction.
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of the dynamic system of equations, some of which require numeric integration. In accordance with Faia and Monacelli (2007), we find that the optimal policy should 7 Since the search for the optimal policy is relatively time-consuming in this model, we have not computed the welfare for policies that neglect the price of capital. The low speed of computation is caused by the repeated numerical evaluation of the Hessian matrix place again a negative weight on the price of capital. The welfare effects are as small as for the model without the financial friction.
There are two possible interpretations for the small quantitative effects: either the welfare effect of the financial friction are small and/or asset price targeting is not able to moderate this friction. In order to study the first explanation, we compare the welfare in the economy with and without frictions. For this reason, we simulate 1,000,000 time series of 1,000 periods for the two economies and compare the average utility of the households. We find that the average utility is smaller in the model without frictions and that the effect amounts to x% of total consumption. Accordingly, our results suggest that the introduction of a q-target rule does not help to moderate frictions in financial markets.
Conclusion
As our main result, we find that the welfare effects of monetary policy from targeting Tobin's are of negligible magnitude if business cycles are (mainly) driven by technology shocks. In this case, Tobin's q does not contain much additional information for the monetary authority that is not already reflected in the output gap and the inflation rate.
However, we would like to caution the reader to interpret our results carefully because we have restricted our attention to the study of technology shocks. As pointed out by Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011) , a shock to financial wealth is important for the explanation of business cycle fluctuations of GDP and investment. Following these authors, we are planning to introduce two additional kind of shocks in our model, a shock on financial wealth of entrepreneurs and a shock on consumption preferences. We expect that, as a consequence of these shocks (especially with respect to the first shock), the additional informational content of Tobin's q increases and, therefore, potential welfare effects will be magnified.
Appendix

A Analysis of the Model
A.1 Price Setting
Consider the relative price P jt+s /P t+s of an intermediary goods producer j receiving the signal to choose its optimal relative price p At = P At /P t in period t and that has not been able to reset its price up to period t + s:
Accordingly, the firm will choose p At in period t to maximize
The first-order condition for this problem is: 
The price index (2.3) implies
The second equality follows from the updating rule (2.7) and the fact that the nonoptimizers are a random sample of optimizers and non-optimizers. Dividing by P t on both sides delivers:
Market clearing requires
Using the same reasoning forP t as for the price index P t yields:
A.2 Wage Setting
Consider the real wage W ht /P t of a household member who has set his wage optimally in period t tow t = W At /P t and who has not been able to do so again until period s = 1, 2, . . . . This is given by
and the demand for his type of labor service equals
where w t+s denotes the real wage prevailing in period t+s. Accordingly, the Lagrangian for the optimal real wage reads:
The first-order condition with respect tow t is
Using Λ ht+s = Λ t+s this can be arranged to read
The wage index (2.24) implies
so that the real wage equals
Finally consider the index
in the families current-period utility function. Using (2.23), this can be writteñ
.
Using the same line of argument employed to derive (A.1f) yields the dynamic equation for the measure of wage dispersion s n t :
(s
Note that we must track the variableÑ t in order to compute our welfare measure.
A.3 Dynamics
The full model consists of equations (A. 
(A.3b)
A.4 Stationary Solution and Calibration
The model is solved via a second-order approximation of the decision rules at the stationary solution of the deterministic version of the model. This solution follows from the model's equations if we set the shocks equal to Z t = 1, and G t = G and cancel the time indices.
In the first step we determine v andω. We proceed as Fuerst (1997, 1998 ) and employ a log-normal distribution for φ with parameters µ ω and σ ω . We determine these parameters and the stationary bankruptcy thresholdω from three conditions:
i. We assume a mean of one:
ii. a bankruptcy rate of Φ(ω) = 0.00974 (taken from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) , p.
590),
iii. and an external finance premium ofω g(ω) − 1 = r L = 1.0187 0.25 − 1 (also taken from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) , p. 590)
Givenω we can solve (2.19a) for v.
In the second step we determine the additional discount parameter γ. The stationary versions of (2.28b) and (2.21) imply
In the third step we solve the stationary wage and price equations. It is immediate from equation (A.1d) that p A = 1 so that equation (A.1f) implies s y = 1 and equation
Equation (A.2d) impliesw = w so thats n = 1 via (A.2e) and N =Ñ from (A.2f).
The stationary values of the auxiliary variables follow from (A.2b) and (A.2c) as
In the fourth step we solve for Y /K. Our assumption with respect to the function Ψ in (2.33) imply q = 1 (see (2.5a) and r K = 0 (see (2.5b)) so that equations (2.14b) and (2.28b) can be solved for
The production function (2.14c) yields
( A.4h) Given N this allows us to compute K, Y , I = δK. The solution for consumption follows from (2.37):
so that Λ is determined by (2.28a):
(A.4j) Equation (2.14a) determines the stationary real wage w. We are now able to determine the parameter ν 0 from condition (A.4f) and the auxiliary variables Γ 1 , Γ 2 , ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 from (A.4b)-(A.4e).
In the last step we can compute aggregate net worth from equation (2.36):
aggregate firm capital from (2.35) A.4l) and dividends distributed from primary production firms to the household from (2.34)
In our simulations we follow Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) 
C Zero Lower Bound
The Taylor rules which we consider must satisfy the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate: Q t ≥ 1. Since our solution rests on perturbation methods, we cannot directly take care of this constraint. We, thus, follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), p.31, who propose to disregard solutions which entail a significant probability to violate this constraint. Assume Q t − Q is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ Q so thatz ≡ (1 − Q)/σ Q is a standard normal random variable. For z = −2.05 the probability of the event z ≤z is 2 percent. Therefor, we disregard solutions for which σ Q ≥ (Q − 1)/2.05.
To determine whether or not a particular monetary policy violates this condition, we must compute the unconditional variance σ 2 Q of the deviation of the interest factor Q t from its non-stochastic stationary solution Q. 
